Introduction
In 2010 China's foreign minister visited Yoni, a small village in Sierra Leone, with a grand school-building plan. While Sierra Leone could certainly use more schools, "some wondered why the Chinese chose the middle of the bush for the project" (The Economist, 2017) . As it turns out, Yoni is the home village of Ernest Bai Koroma, Sierra Leone's president at the time.
By a similar coincidence, of the three primary schools constructed with Chinese funds in rural Tanzania, one was built in the then President Jakaya Kikwete's hometown of Msoga (Hodzi, 2017) . Around the same time, in Namibia, Chinese scholarships went to children of top ministers and public officials, reigniting a debate that China uses its development finance "to create elite alliances and ease the approval of no-bid contracts" (The New York Times, 2009 ).
These are not isolated incidents; the emergence of China as a key development partner in Africa has been the subject of much controversy (see e.g. the discussion in Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Penhelt, 2007; Bräutigam, 2009; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015) , not least for the alleged tendency of funds to end up in the pockets of political elites. Indeed, recent empirical evidence back up the anecdotal reports, suggesting that Chinese aid may be particularly easy to exploit for politicians who are engaged in patronage politics (Dreher et al., 2016 ).
In the African context, where patronage politics is commonly suggested to have an ethnic dimension (see e.g. Lemarchand, 1972; Wantchekon, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008) , this raises questions regarding potentially important externalities of aid. In particular, if development finance ends up in the pockets of political elites and their ethno-regional networks, does this exacerbate ethnic grievances and contribute to ethnic mobilization? Against this background, the present study investigates whether Chinese development projects fuel local ethnic identities in African partner countries.
Until recently, studying the motivations behind and effects of Chinese development finance has been very difficult since the Chinese government, unlike the OECD-DAC donors, does not routinely publish information on its foreign assistance. However, with a new comprehensive dataset on Chinese Official Finance to Africa issued by the AidData research laboratory (Bluhm et al., 2018) , systematic quantitative analysis of Chinese aid flows is now Due to the likelihood of feeding into horizontal inequalities, ethnically biased aid is problematic. Horizontal inequalities -or inequalities between groups defined culturally, e.g. in terms of ethnic, religious or regional identity -matter both for individual well-being and instrumentally, for economic efficiency and social stability (Stewart et al., 2005) . If membership of a group is part of a person's identity (see e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) , their well-being will not only depend on individual circumstances, but also on how well their group is doing. Instrumentally, group inequalities may give rise to grievances that stimulate social unrest and conflict that undermine development efforts.
The concern that aid may exacerbate group inequalities, either because the donor's aid allocation decisions in themselves lead to a distribution of resources that worsens these inequalities or because elite capture of aid during the implementation phase has a similar effect (Brown et al., 2010) , is not unique to Chinese aid. Indeed, empirical studies on sub-national aid allocation patterns of other donors often point to insufficient targeting of poor areas (see e.g. Powell and Findley, 2012; Öhler and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Briggs, 2017) as well as elite capture of aid (se e.g. Briggs, 2014; Jablonski, 2014; Dreher et al., 2016) .
However, a number of commonly suggested features of Chinese development finance make it particularly relevant to study in this context. To begin with, the demand-driven nature of the Chinese aid allocation process (Brautigam, 2011; Dreher et al., 2016 ) and China's policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of partner countries (State Council, 2014) arguably make it prone to elite capture and possible ethnic bias. Furthermore, rather than broad-based development projects established in country poverty reduction strategies, it is often suggested that China tends to finance highly visible prestige projects benefiting a select few (see e.g. Tull, 2006) . Citizens in the local area are thus likely to observe the concerned development project being implemented without necessarily getting a share of the rewards, which may lead to perceptions of unfair treatment.
The study asks whether the implementation of Chinese development projects fuels ethnic identities near project sites, whether the effect is uniform across groups, and whether China stands out from other donors in this respect. To this end, a new geo-referenced dataset on the subnational allocation of Chinese development finance projects to Africa over the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] period is geographically matched with 94,954 respondents from three Afrobarometer survey waves across 18 African countries. The estimation strategy to account for the endogenous placement of Chinese project sites consists in comparing the estimated effect of living near a site where a Chinese project was under implementation at the time of the interview, to that of living near a site where we know a Chinese project will appear subsequently.
The empirical results indeed suggest that living near an ongoing Chinese project fuels ethnic identities. The effect is not uniform though, but driven by people who belong to the outgroup. The fact that the effect is only present among non-coethnics of the country president may signal that it is driven by ethnic grievances originating in perceived ethnic bias rather than ethnic competition for resources more generally. Furthermore, a comparison across donors reveals that Chinese development projects stand out from those of other influential donors in terms of fueling ethnic identities. If ethnic identities were mobilized by competition for the inflow of aid funds more broadly, one would expect the hypothesized pattern observed for China to be similar across donors. Hence, this too seemingly speaks against the general ethnic competition mechanism.
Replicating the key analysis for World Bank projects as well as for other bilateral donors the results in fact indicate the reverse, i.e. that living near an ongoing as opposed to a future project comes with weaker ethnic identification. Moreover, this effect is uniform across in-and out-group, thus providing no indication of differential experiences across ethnic groups. This suggestive finding opens for interesting future research: can aid projects, if implemented in an ethnically neutral fashion, in effect act to bring people together, across ethnic group lines?
Being the first effort to systemically investigate the effects of development projects on local ethnic identities in African partner countries, the study makes two principal contributions.
First, it contributes directly to the literature on ethnic mobilization in Africa (e.g. Posner, 2003; Posner, 2004; Eifert et al., 2010) . Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010) find that the degree of ethnic identification in Africa varies considerably over time and is influenced by political competition. The present study brings this thinking to the aid literature, where a similar argument can be made for ethnic identities reacting to the infusion of donor funds. As such, it also adds to a broader literature on ethnic politics in Africa (see e.g. Lemarchand, 1972; Wantchekon, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Franck and Rainer; Hodler and Rachky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015; Ahlerup and Isaksson, 2015; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Isaksson and Bigsten, 2017) .
Second, it contributes to the emerging literature evaluating the sub-national allocation and impacts of aid (e.g. Francken et al., 2012; Nunnenkamp et al., 2012; Powell and Findley, 2012; Briggs, 2014; Jablonski, 2014; Öhler and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Berlin et al., 2017; Briggs, 2017) . In particular, it adds to the recent strand of this literature focusing on the allocation and local externalities of Chinese aid (Dreher et al., 2016; Brazys et al., 2017; Bluhm et al., 2018; Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018a,b) . As noted by Bluhm et al. (2018) an important question that remains unanswered in this strand of literature is whether and to what extent Chinese development projects widen or narrow inequalities in poor countries. Bluhm and co-authors find that Chinese development projects in general, and Chinese transportation projects in particular, reduce spatial inequality measured in terms of night time light. They do not, however, consider inequalities across ethnic groups.
Chinese aid and ethnic identities: Mechanisms
The idea that Chinese development projects may fuel local ethnic identities rests on a constructivist account of ethnicity, according to which ethnic identities are mobilized in the pursuit of state resources as opposed to being primordial and hardwired (see e.g. Posner, 2003; Posner, 2004; Kasara, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010) .
1 Against this background, the study considers two (non-mutually exclusive) channels through which aid projects may fuel local ethnic identities.
First, competition for the inflow of resources that aid constitutes could mobilize ethnic identities across the board. The results of Eifert et al. (2010) , mentioned above, speak in favour of such a mechanism. In particular, drawing on survey data across 10 African countries their findings suggest that ethnic cleavages are more salient at election times and in cases where the winning party won by a small margin. They interpret this as supporting an instrumental understanding of ethnicity, where ethnic identities are mobilized in the struggle for political power and economic resources. By this reasoning, the inflow of resources could fuel ethnic identities even in the absence of ethnic bias, simply by raising the stakes in the struggle for resources.
A second possible mechanism, however, is that perceived ethnic bias in the delivery of aid fuels ethnic grievances and identities in groups that perceive themselves as disadvantaged. The idea that unequal treatment of ethnic groups raise group members' ethnic awareness is in line with a 'reactive ethnicity' approach, according to which ethnic mobilization is prompted by an unequal division of resources along ethnic lines (Vermeersch, 2011) . Studies in psychology and sociology have shown that systematic discrimination of ethnic minorities may result in 1 There is also experimental evidence to this effect. Public goods games in Uganda demonstrate that the possibility of social sanctions influence whether individuals treat coethnics differently than members of other groups. In particular, co-ethnics are only more likely to favour each other if they are seen to do so, and thus risk that noncooperative behavuiour is met with future sanctions (Habyarimana et al., 2007 (Habyarimana et al., , 2009 increased ethnic identification among the minorities' group members (see the discussion in Çelik, 2015) . Considering the recent empirical evidence that Chinese development finance is particularly prone to elite capture and possible ethnic bias (Dreher et al., 2016) , the discussion below will focus on potential sources of ethnic bias in the (Chinese) aid delivery process.
Three levels of potential ethnic bias in the aid delivery process
Ethnic bias could take place at different levels and take different forms depending on the type and targeting of the projects. In particular, it is useful to make a distinction between ethnic bias in 1) geographic allocation, 2) local implementation and 3) local rewards. Ethnic bias in geographic allocation implies that development projects (for whatever reason) tend to be located in areas disproportionately populated by particular ethnic groups. Ethnic bias in local implementation, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the local implementation process of development projects -e.g. in terms of staffing and contracts awarded -systematically benefits some particular group. Ethnic bias in local rewards, finally, refers to ethnic bias in the local distribution of the end product of the project.
Consider a development project focusing on building schools. Ethnic bias in geographic allocation would imply that the schools are built in areas disproportionately populated by a specific ethnic group. Ethnic bias in local implementation of the school project could for instance refer to a situation where building contracts awarded and teachers hired systematically benefit a particular group in the local areas. Ethnic bias in local rewards, finally, would in this particular example refer to kids from a particular group getting preferential access to the schools. Of course, the bias may well operate on more than one level. Figure 1 illustrates the variety of forms the bias could take depending on which level(s) it operates. For instance, even if there is no ethnic bias in the geographic allocation stage -i.e.
Chinese projects do not systematically favour regions disproportionately populated by a particular ethnic group -there may well be ethnic bias in the local implementation and distribution of rewards. Indeed, if there is ethnic bias in the local government and they are given substantial discretion during the implementation phase of the project, this seems likely.
The third stage -the local distribution of rewards -is closely related to the degree of excludability of the end product, which has implications for how narrowly the good can be targeted, and to what extent benefits are likely to spill over to different groups (see the reasoning in Isaksson and Bigsten, 2017) . If the development project involves the distribution of public goods, then even if there is ethnic bias in geographic allocation, benefits are still likely to spill over to other groups. If, on the other hand, the rewards from a development project consist in narrowly targeted private (i.e. excludable) goods, then with ethnic bias in local rewards, benefits need not spill over to other groups. Rather, the patronage network may in effect be narrower than the ethnic group, meaning that many co-ethnics of the politician in power are still excluded from the rewards (Kasara, 2007) .
Chinese development finance and risk of ethnic bias
Two related features of Chinese development finance give partner country governments considerable discretion in the distribution of funds, thereby arguably making it prone to elite capture and possible ethnic bias in geographic allocation and local implementation and distribution of rewards. First, China has an explicit policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipients (State Council, 2014) . While recipient country governments tend to see the principle as a sign of China respecting their countries' sovereignty, critics view it as a convenient rationale for economic involvement in undemocratic and corrupt regimes and suggest that it makes Chinese aid easy to exploit for politicians (see e.g. Tull, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Naím, 2007; Pehnelt, 2007; Marantidou and Glosserman, 2015) .
Second, and related, the demand-driven nature of the Chinese aid allocation process (see e.g. Brautigam, 2011) arguably gives the domestic authorities in partner countries leeway to allocate funds to activities and locations that best suit their own interests. As described in detail in Dreher et al. (2016) , China's aid allocation tends to be based on requests from recipientcountry governments. Their aid packages and projects are often negotiated in high-level meetings with political leaders rather than publicly outlined in country development assistance strategies, with the initiative generally coming from the recipient side. Interpreted favorably, this could again be seen as a sign of ensuring partner country ownership of development policy.
And importantly, African leaders may use the discretion in the distribution of Chinese funds to address key development challenges that have not attracted sufficient funding from Western donors. At the same time, however, a request-based system of aid project delivery may provide opportunities for recipient country governments to use funds strategically by promoting a subnational distribution of funds that favors their patronage network. As noted, there is both anecdotal reports and systematic empirical evidence (Dreher et al., 2016) 
Empirical implications
Against this background, it is interesting to study whether Chinese development projects fuel local ethnic identities, and whether the potential effect varies depending on whether the respondents belong to an in-group -proxied by being a co-ethnic with the country president at the time of the survey -or an out-group.
The existence (or lack) of parameter heterogeneity arguably sheds light on the theoretical mechanisms involved. If there is an effect, and it is uniform across groups, this would seem to imply that it is competition for the inflow of resources in and of itself, rather than perceptions of ethnic bias in the distribution of these resources, that mobilize ethnic identities. If the effect is significantly stronger in the out-group, on the other hand, this arguably signals that the effect is driven by ethnic grievances originating in perceived ethnic bias in disadvantaged groups.
Provided that ethnic bias in aid allocation and implementation is not a universal phenomenon existing across all donors, comparing the results for Chinese development projects with those obtained when considering the projects of other influential donors could also be revealing in this regard. If the hypothesized effect is observed for all donors, this too would arguably add support to the idea that it is competition for the inflow of resources more generally, rather than perceived ethnic bias in the distribution of these resources, that mobilize ethnic identities. The next section elaborates on how to address the research questions empirically.
To explore the local effects of Chinese development projects on ethnic identities in Africa, I
geographically match spatial data on China's official financial flows to the continent over the period 2000-2014 with 94,954 respondents from 18 African countries 2 obtained from rounds 3-6 of the Afrobarometer survey.
The data on Chinese aid projects is obtained from geo-referenced project-level data of AidData's Geocoded Global Chinese Official Finance Version 1.1.1 dataset (Bluhm et al., 2018) . Since the Chinese government does not release official, project-level financial information about its foreign aid activities, this data is based on an open-source media based data collection technique, synthesizing and standardizing a large amount of information on
Chinese development finance to African countries (described in detail in Strange et al., 2013 and 2015) . While information extracted from public media outlets is of course an imperfect substitute for complete statistical data from official sources, the authors provide a careful description of how they dealt with challenges in the data collection process. 3 Furthermore, the only information used here is whether, where and when a project was implemented. That is, I
do not make use of potentially sensitive and less reliable information on e.g. specific aid volumes or details from the implementation process.
The aid data contains latitude and longitude project co-ordinates, and provide information about the precision of the location identified (for details about the geocoding methodology reports to identify more in ethnic than in national terms. 4 In the overall estimation sample, 13 percent of the respondents report to identify in ethnic terms (Table A1) , the corresponding country shares ranging from around 4 percent in Tanzania and Cape Verde, to around 24 percent in Mali ( Figure A1 ).
The main explanatory variables, which will be described in greater detail below, focus on living near a Chinese project site -either a site where a project is being implemented at the time of the survey (Ongoing) or a site where a project will be opened but where implementation
had not yet been initiated at the time of the survey (Future). Tables A1-A2 .
Estimation strategy
The distribution of aid within countries is by no means random, implying that some individuals and sub-national areas, with certain characteristics, will be more likely than others to be targeted by aid. Members of the same ethnic group often live geographically clustered and a common argument is that African policy-makers tend to favour their own homelands and ethnic groups in the allocation of funds. Hence, some areas and ethnic groups -and thus a non-random group of individuals with particular ethnic identities and living conditions -will presumably be more likely to be targeted by aid than others. For this reason, it is not plausible to assume that there is no relationship between project localization and the pre-existing characteristics of project sites and of the population residing in the surrounding areas. The implication is that it is problematic to draw conclusions about the causal effect of aid on ethnic identities from a direct comparison of the ethnic identities of people living close to and far away from project sites.
In order to deal with these empirical challenges, I use a spatial-temporal estimation strategy resembling that in Knutsen et al. (2016) . 6 In particular, I compare the estimated effect of living near sites where a Chinese development project is currently under implementation with the estimated effect of living near sites where a project will be opened but where implementation had not yet been initiated at the time the Afrobarometer covered that particular area.
While the fact that the Afrobarometer is not a panel hinders me from following specific localities over time, before and after a project was initiated, with this estimation strategy I can still make use of the time variation in the data. Specifically, I utilize the fact that there is information about at what point in time and in what localities aid projects have been implemented, and that the survey data covers different localities at different points in time.
This makes it possible to identify respondents living in areas where a project was ongoing at the time of the survey and compare them with respondents living in areas where, in hindsight, we know that a project will start, but where implementation had yet to begin at the time of the survey.
Assuming that ethnic identities are affected within a cut-off distance of Chinese projects, the main identification strategy includes three groups of individuals, namely 1) those within 25 km of at least one ongoing project site (Ongoing, applying to 19 percent of respondents), 2) those within 25 km of a site where a project will start, but where implementation was yet to begin at the survey date and not close to any ongoing projects (Future, applying to 3 percent of respondents), and 3) those with more than 25 km from any project site (the omitted reference category in the regressions, applying to 78 percent of respondents). 7 The baseline regression takes the form:
where the ethnic identity Y for an individual i in cluster v at year t is regressed -in the benchmark setup using linear probability models -on a dummy variable Ongoing capturing whether the individual lives within the specified cut-off distance of an ongoing Chinese Interpreting the coefficient on Ongoing ( 1 ) in isolation as capturing an effect of Chinese development projects on local ethnic identities would necessitate that the location of Chinese development projects is not correlated with pre-existing ethnic sentiments. As can be 7 I exclude respondents who live within the cut-off distance of a site where the implementation of a project has been completed prior to the interview date (4.6 percent of respondents, see Table A1 ). Furthermore, this type of time variation -with some areas being surveyed earlier and others later -exist within as well as across survey waves. Considering the concern that projects implemented later may differ systematically from projects implemented earlier, this is reassuring. That said, however, there is an over-representation of respondents connected to ongoing projects in the later survey waves, why the possible effects of project timing will be evaluated in the sensitivity analysis.
Using the above approach to study whether Chinese development projects affect local ethnic identities, one has to make an assumption about the geographical reach of the potential effect. This, in turn, should reasonably depend on how far from project sites citizens are aware of the project's existence and its distribution of rewards. In particular, observing a project being implemented without experiencing any of its benefits could -if the perceived unfairness is interpreted in ethnic terms -presumably fuel ethnic grievances. As discussed in Knutsen et al.
(2016), the appropriate cut-off distance from a project -within which an individual will be considered 'treated' -is an empirical question. I use a 25 km cut-off in the benchmark estimation, but results using alternative cut-offs (50 and 75 km) are also presented.
Results
The benchmark results, presented in Column 1 of Table 1 , indeed indicate that respondents living near an ongoing rather than a future project are more likely to identify in ethnic terms.
The estimation demonstrates the importance of taking the non-random selection of Chinese project sites into account. Looking at the parameter of interest in isolation, the results at first sight seem to indicate that, if anything, people living close to an ongoing Chinese project are less likely to identify in ethnic terms. As noted, however, interpreting the parameter of the Ongoing variable as capturing an effect of Chinese development projects on ethnic identities requires that the location of Chinese development projects is not correlated with pre-existing ethnic sentiments in these areas.
As it turns out, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on future in Column 1 suggests that Chinese projects tend to be located in areas with lower pre-existing ethnic at the 5 percent level. In relation to the overall sample mean of the dependent variable (Table   A1) , the difference is 18 percent and thus quite sizeable.
Sensitivity analysis
A similar pattern is observable in a range of alternative specifications (Columns 2-12, Table   1 ). Using a wider geographic cut-off -50 km rather than 25 (see Column 2) -the difference seemingly shrinks slightly but is still statistically significant. Considering an even wider radius around project sites (75 km, see Column 3) the pattern is similar, but the difference (β ongoing − β future ) is no longer statistically significant, thus suggesting that the effect fades with distance from project sites, as can be expected. Calculating the marginal effects from a probit estimation rather than using a LPM (Column 4), the observed difference remains positive but is not quite 
Heterogeneity across in-group and out-group
Above we considered the local effect of Chinese development projects on the ethnic identities of citizens in general, making no distinction between people from different ethnic groups.
Arguably, though, these potential effects are unlikely to be uniform across groups. If the allocation and implementation of Chinese development projects involve ethnic bias, from which co-ethnics of the country's president stand to gain, one may suspect ethnic grievances, arguably fueling ethnic identities, among people belonging to other groups that perhaps do not benefit to the same extent. This section assesses whether the effect of living near a Chinese development project varies across in-group and out-groups, defined in terms of co-ethnicity with the country's top leadership.
In a first step, let us explore whether in-groups and out-groups differ systematically in terms of geographic proximity to Chinese development projects. Using the terminology from Section 2, is there ethnic bias in geographic allocation of Chinese projects? Dreher et al. (2016) found The results, presented in Table 2 , provide some indication that in-groups and out-groups differ in terms of geographic proximity to Chinese project sites. Conditional on baseline controls, year-and country fixed effects, co-ethnics of the country president are 1.2 percentage points more likely than members of other groups to live near a site where a Chinese project will be implemented in the future. Moreover, they tend to have a greater number of Chinese projects within 25 km. Based on the data at hand, we cannot judge whether this pattern is purposeful -it may well be driven by, say, better infrastructure or economic opportunities in areas where the in-group is over-represented rather than an intention to favour or discriminate certain groups. Moreover, the observed differences are relatively small, and in terms of the probability of having an ongoing Chinese projects within 25 km and with regard to the distance to nearest Chinese project, co-ethnics of the president do not stand out from members of other groups.
Importantly, however, measures of geographic proximity to Chinese projects do not capture ethnic bias in local implementation and rewards, or perceptions thereof. It may be that
Chinese projects disproportionately cater to the needs of the in-group. In effect, regardless of whether this is true, members of other ethnic groups may perceive that they are excluded from the rewards, which may fuel ethnic grievances. Lacking a direct measure of ethnic bias in local implementation and rewards of Chinese development projects, what one can do, is consider whether the Chinese presence has different effects on the ethnic identities of in-groups and outgroups in the local area.
The estimations in Table 3 include the dummy variable for belonging to the in-group. In
Column 1, we can note that compared to people from other groups, co-ethnics of the president are around 2 percentage points less likely to identify in ethnic terms, conditional on baseline controls. If ethnic grievances fuel ethnic identities, lower ethnic identification in a potentially privileged in-group is arguably not surprising. Another interpretation, in line with some recent empirical evidence (Green, 2018) , is that people are more likely to identify with the broader nation-state when a co-ethnic controls the state. The higher ethnic identification among people living close to ongoing as compared to future Chinese project sites remains intact.
Considering the possibility of perceptions of unfair treatment arising after project start, Column 2 introduces an interaction term between the dummy for belonging to the same group as the country president and the dummy for living close to ongoing Chinese development projects. This allows the effect of living near a Chinese project to vary depending on whether the respondent belongs to the in-or out-group. We see that for people not part of the president's ethnic group (in-group=0), living near an ongoing as compared to a future Chinese project site still comes with a greater tendency to identify in ethnic terms. For members of the in-group, on the other hand, this difference is not statistically significant. As discussed in Section 2, this finding is in line with the idea that the greater ethnic identification reported among people living close to ongoing (as compared to future) Chinese development projects could be driven by ethnic grievances originating in perceived ethnic bias.
Heterogeneity across sub-samples
The aggregate effect is likely to mask considerable variation across sample countries. The
African countries in the sample differ considerably, not least with respect to the existence, nature and salience of ethnic divisions. The estimations presented in Table 4 explore heterogeneity across sub-samples. As it turns out, the estimated effect is by no means uniform across different samples.
To begin with, one may not expect the observed pattern in countries where ethnic identities are not salient. Splitting the 18 sample countries by the average share identifying in ethnic terms (Columns 1-2), we can in line with this note that the identified difference in ethnic identification between people living near ongoing and future Chinese project sites is only present in the nine country-sample where ethnic identities are more common.
Similarly, believing that perceptions of ethnic bias contribute to fueling ethnic identities near project sites, one may suspect the observed pattern to be more pronounced in countries marked by ethnic inequalities. As discussed by Alesina et al. (2016) , ethnic inequality is likely to generate envy and perceptions that the system is unfair. The estimations in Columns 3 and 4 split the sample countries by extent of ethnic inequalities, as measured by Alesina et al. (2016) . 11 The observed difference in ethnic identification is statistically significant in the high ethnic inequality sample, but not quite so in the low inequality sample.
Furthermore, based on a modernization argument (see e.g. the discussion in Posner, 2004) , one may suspect ethnic divisions to be more salient (and ethnically biased project implementation to be more visible?) in more traditional rural communities than in more dynamic urban areas. Whereas rural African communities are often suggested to be tightly knit, with ethnic and kinship relations regulating access to resources, urban dwellers are often assumed to be more individualistic (see the reasoning in e.g. Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) . In These sample splits are of course merely speculative. With only 18 sample countries, we cannot draw any broader conclusions on systematic country variation in results. The results do, however, serve as a reminder that the observed pattern is an average effect, and not uniform across sample countries.
Comparison with other donors
Chinese development projects seemingly stand out from other influential donors in terms of fueling ethnic identities. Replicating the key regressions for World Bank projects (Table 5),   12 for which there is also geo-referenced data available for a large multi-country African sample, the results do not suggest an equivalent pattern. In fact, they indicate the reverse, i.e. that living near an ongoing as opposed to a future project comes with weaker ethnic identification.
13
Moreover, this effect is uniform across in-and out-group, thus providing no indication of differential experiences across ethnic groups. A generous interpretation of the weaker ethnic identification observed near ongoing World Bank project sites is that ethnically neutral project implementation may act to attenuate ethnic identities in these areas. However, a more thorough analysis of World Bank projects would clearly be necessary in order to uncover the potential mechanisms involved. For the purpose of this study, it suffices to note that Chinese development projects stand out from World Bank projects in terms of fueling ethnic identities close to project sites.
Do the different results obtained for Chinese and World Bank projects simply reflect differences in the impact of bilateral and multilateral aid? Indeed, a common argument is that bilateral aid is often tied to the political agenda of the donor country and that it is less focused on promoting good governance in the recipient country (see the discussion in Charron, 2011) .
It is thus a good idea to compare the effects of Chinese aid projects to those of other bilateral donors.
For other bilateral donors, geocoded aid project data is available on a large scale only for a small selection of African countries. In particular, for Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda and Senegal there is geocoded aid data for both China and other donor countries, thus allowing for comparison. 14 Table 6 presents the results of the equivalent regressions for other bilateral donor projects in these countries.
Again, the findings suggest a pattern different from that observed for Chinese projects.
Just as for World Bank projects, the results for other bilateral aid, if anything, indicate that living near an ongoing as opposed to a future project comes with weaker ethnic identification.
Moreover, there is again no indication of parameter heterogeneity across in-and out-group, and hence no suggestion of differential experiences across ethnic groups. While these results 13 Restricting the estimation sample to include only countries with observations connected to both ongoing and future World Bank development projects results in a sample consisting of 13 of the 18 countries included in the benchmark sample for Chinese projects. For comparability, we can note that the benchmark result for Chinese projects remains when using this smaller sample. Furthermore, the World Bank result is stable over a wide range of specifications (equivalent to those presented in Table 1 ).
are not very robust across alternative specifications (not presented), probably reflecting the limited number of sample countries in focus and the heterogeneity of the donors included, they never indicate that having an ongoing project in the local area fuels ethnic identities. In sum,
we can thus note that Chinese development projects seemingly stand out from other influential donors in this respect.
Conclusions
Recent empirical evidence suggest that Chinese aid may be particularly easy to exploit for politicians who are engaged in patronage politics. This raises important questions regarding potential externalities of aid. In particular, if development finance ends up in the pockets of political elites and their ethno-regional networks, does this exacerbate ethnic grievances and contribute to ethnic mobilization? The present paper examined whether Chinese development projects fuel local ethnic identities in African partner countries.
Two mechanisms through which this may occur were proposed. First, competition for the inflow of resources that aid constitutes could mobilize ethnic identities across the board.
Second, perceptions of ethnically biased aid may fuel ethnic identities in disadvantaged groups.
Against this background, the study asked whether the implementation of Chinese development projects fuels ethnic identities near project sites, whether the potential effect is uniform across groups, and whether it varies across donors.
The empirical analysis drew on a new geo-referenced dataset on the subnational allocation The empirical results indicate substantial country variation, serving as a reminder that the African countries in the sample differ considerably in terms of (for instance) the existence, nature and salience of ethnic divisions. On average, however, they indeed suggest that living near an ongoing Chinese project fuels ethnic identities, thus calling attention to a potentially important externality of aid.
Notably, the effect is driven by people who belong to the out-group, i.e. those who are not co-ethnics of the country president at the time of the survey. The results call attention to the importance of considering the distributional consequences of aid, and of taking into account between group inequalities when doing so. Since ethnic bias could operate at several levels -in geographic allocation, during local implementation and in the local distribution of rewards -this requires an awareness of distributional impacts throughout the project implementation phase. On a more general level, the paper highlights the need to consider not only to what extent aid achieves its explicit objectives, but also its potential unintended effects, or externalities. These could be positive or negative and are likely to influence the long-term sustainability of a project. by the survey clusters) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All regressions include baseline controls and year and country fixed effects; Column 3 presents marginal effects from a probit estimation, the presented difference in difference here refers to the difference between the concerned coefficients, and the test-statistic and associated p-value to a chi2 distribution; In Column 10, ongoing25 and future25 include only projects that started or will start within 5 years of the interview date; Column 12 excludes the observations connected to future projects starting within the next year; Column 13 interacts the full set of country dummies with the full set of year dummies. 
Figures and tables

